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The current national economic situation has forced every Department of Defense 
program to find ways to accomplish more with fewer resources. Spacelift, as one of the 
most expensive government programs, has continuously been scrutinized and challenged 
to lower costs and work more efficiently. This thesis reviews a summarized history of 
events that brought the current launch community to its present state and then details the 
events of the NROL-41 launch campaign. NROL-41 was the most efficient launch 
campaign to date and a study of the work completed on the launch shows the depth of 
effort required to achieve mission success. 
Spacelift is an expensive and dangerous endeavor, but the risk of launch failures 
and loss of satellites is worth every penny spent to deliver mission success. This thesis 
provides the data to justify those costs as well as recommendations of studies that could 
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“The only constant is change, continuing change, inevitable change, that is the 
dominant factor in society today. No sensible decision can be made any longer without 
taking into account not only the world as it is, but the world as it will be….” [1]  While 
he was not specifically referring to the United States’ spacelift mission, Mr. Asimov’s 
words ring true with the evolution of military capabilities and the current economic 
challenges facing the government on the whole. When looking at the U.S. spacelift 
capabilities, questions are constantly asked challenging the cost of operations as well as 
the need for the depth of support we currently utilize. Today, the U.S. is realizing an 
unprecedented string of launch success without catastrophic failure and while no one 
wants to see that record change, the question is being asked if equal success can be 
achieved faster and at a lower cost. 
Per program, the largest portion of the United States Air Force budget is dedicated 
to space assets, specifically on the manufacturing, testing, launch and operation of 
satellites. The Fiscal Year 2011 and 2012 procurement budget is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Fiscal Year 11 and 12 Air Force Procurement Budget. From [2]. 
It is important to note that the dollars shown in Figure 1 must be compared to the 
quantities shown in Figure 2 in order to see the per program budget disparity. In Fiscal 
Year 2012, an average of over one hundred and twenty five million dollars was spent on 
each aircraft where an average of over three hundred and thirty one million dollars were 
spent on nine space assets (four launch vehicles and five satellites). 
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Figure 2.  Fiscal Year 11 and 12 Air Force Procurement Quantities. From [2]. 
In addition to being the most expensive acquisitions in the Air Force, the life of 
these assets differs from traditional programs. Due to the nature of the environment in 
which they operate, space assets spend over seventy percent of their budgeted life on the 
ground before actually operating in their intended field. Figure 3 shows the acquisition 
model for assets like satellites and launch vehicles and, as shown by the marker labeled 
“IOC,” illustrates the point that much time and money are invested in these assets before 
they are able to prove their worth in the field. 
 
Figure 3.  Acquisition Model for Small Quantity Space Programs. From [3]. 
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In the entire life cycle of a satellite there are multitudes of risks which jeopardize 
mission success and of all those risks, none is more dangerous than launch. Satellites can 
take between ten and twenty years to design and build and cost billions of dollars. Entire 
careers have been spent building individual systems and if these systems do not arrive 
precisely in their intended orbit they are unable to operate as designed. The transition 
from Earth to space is wrought with perils. The launch vehicles contain tens of thousands 
of gallons of highly flammable substances and are surrounded by self-destruct and safety 
devices intended to protect life and property surrounding a launch site. In addition to the 
volatile risks during launch, the satellite is exposed to tremendous physical and acoustic 
vibrations as well as temperature changes and debris during ascent and deployment. Each 
and every one of these risks are documented, researched, simulated, examined, discussed, 
and eventually accepted by the launch community long before the day of launch. These 
factors are accounted for in the design of the satellite and the design of the rockets in 
order to mitigate them in the most advantageous manner possible. In the case of 
Department of Defense satellites and launches, the designs and efforts are checked and 
re-checked by active duty military, government civilian, independent, contractor review 
teams, prime contractor, and sub-contractors throughout the entire life cycle process.  
There is no doubt that the process is time consuming and expensive, but the cost 
of failure is unacceptable to military operations worldwide. Despite the unprecedented 
string of launch successes we currently enjoy, political pressure is building to reduce the 
cost of launch. Cost reductions directly reduce the amount of technical reviews and layers 
of oversight on each launch campaign. The oversight methodology may seem 
burdensome, but it is the very architecture that allowed the current launch successes. 
Despite today’s budget constrained environment, the United States must continue their 
concerted effort to keep the spacelift industry alive in order to maintain our nations’ 
assured access to space. 
B. OBJECTIVES AND CORE TENETS 
The primary objective of this research is to highlight the level of effort required in 
making a launch successful. Looking through a complete launch campaign for one 
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mission will allow for an in-depth analysis of each of the precautions taken to arrive at 
launch day and execute without mission failure. Further discussion will show how the 
scheduling process is one area that has become a political fighting ground and is 
hampering the overall program thus leading to a decayed industrial base for spacelift. 
This research will focus on the necessary steps required to protect our nation’s on-orbit 
capabilities by assuring the successful launch of billion dollar satellites. The bottom line 
is identifying the level of effort which will provide the level of success demanded by and 
delivered to the operational forces while meeting key modes of operation presented in the 
research questions. 
As conducting programmatic studies may lead into any number of directions, such 
a study requires a certain level of focus. Several attributes or tenets are a necessary 
baseline for discussion and analysis. The attributes, accompanied with the appropriate 
definition, are as follows:  
 Spacelift: The projection of power by delivering satellites, payloads, and 
materiel into or through space  [4].  Spacelift is the physical act of placing 
an object into orbit around Earth. For this research, the object refers to 
satellites. Success requires perfect planning, execution and performance 
from personnel and hardware and may be one of the most complex 
operations the military conducts. There are only two locations in the world 
where EELV spacelift operations are executed; Vandenberg Air Force 
Base, California and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. 
 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV): The intent of the EELV 
program was to utilize common components in the design of a new family 
of launch vehicles in order to reduce cost. The original program goal was 
to reduce cost by 25%–50% when compared to the preceding vehicles. 
 Assured Access to Space: It is the policy of the United States for the 
President to undertake actions appropriate to ensure, to the maximum 
extent practicable, that the United States has the capabilities necessary to 
launch and insert United States national security payloads into space 
whenever such payloads are needed in space. The appropriate actions shall 
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include, at a minimum, providing resources and policy guidance to sustain 
the availability of at least two space launch vehicles (or families of space 
launch vehicles) capable of delivering into space any payload designated 
by the Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intelligence as a 
national security payload and a robust space launch infrastructure and 
industrial base [5]. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How did the launch community arrive at its current state? 
 2. What drives the cost and length of a launch campaign? 
 3. How is a launch campaign planned and executed? 
 4. What does it take to make a launch a success? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will include: 
 A brief history of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program and 
its key members. 
 An analysis and information gathering of space launch campaign 
preparations to include requirements development and refining, rehearsals, 
and incorporation of lessons learned. 
 Information gathering and analysis of key aspects of a launch campaign to 
include manufacturing, engineering, testing, and operations. 
 An analysis of the performance of all the participants within a launch 
campaign. 





1. Research the current prime contractor’s history and evolution  
2. Research and analyze all aspects of a launch campaign through 
participation in nominal and anomalous procedure execution. 
3. Analyze technical data and procedures of a launch campaign to capture 
testing, manufacturing, and operational techniques that are used to ensure 
launch success. 
4. Conduct a validation of current processes through execution of a 
successful launch. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
CHAPTER I. This chapter discusses the context, background, and justification 
for further research into how the launch campaign unfolds and the steps taken to assure 
its success. This background information addresses the reasons for conducting this 
research, and provides foundation for further research of this topic. 
CHAPTER II. This chapter explains the history of the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle program, from where the participants originated, and the current 
structure of the services and products provided. The background of several government 
and civilian organizations are provided in this chapter. The focus is to discuss details of 
past and present decisions that have shaped our launch programs and provide a 
foundation for the study. 
CHAPTER III. This chapter will explain the launch scheduling process. Launch 
scheduling has become a battleground for launch and satellite programs and is critical to 
the timely execution of missions. Various factors have shaped the scheduling process and 
the decisions made in this process drive production timelines and delivery decisions. 
These decisions balance diplomatic, informational, military and economic needs of our 




CHAPTER IV. This chapter will show how the launch community achieved 
readiness to proceed into the launch campaign. The trailblazer for NROL-41 took three 
months to execute and guaranteed that all identifiable risks were documented and 
mitigated prior to delivery and processing of the actual spacecraft. In addition to 
spacecraft readiness, launch vehicle preparations and base support/infrastructure 
requirements were also analyzed. 
CHAPTER V. This chapter will analyze the launch campaign of the NROL-41 
mission from flight hardware arrival through the Day of Launch. Portions of the study 
will look at planning and manufacturing in the years prior to arrival, the majority of the 
data focuses on the integration at the launch site in preparation for launch. 
CHAPTER VI. This chapter provides a conclusion to the research study as well 
as recommends areas for further analysis and research. 
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The United States Air Force has always been driven to achieve and maintain air 
superiority, and over the years that drive has expanded to include outer space. In pursuit 
of this goal, the United States has been building and improving on the technology 
necessary to reach the ultimate high ground since the mid-1950’s. While the early launch 
programs were marred by uncertainty and failures, the industry adapted and overcame the 
unknowns in order to deliver critical capabilities to our nation. 
This chapter details the history of a current contractor for Department of Defense 
spacelift services in order to lay the foundation for the complex work effort required for 
mission success. The work ethic and historical knowledge that drives launch success 
today is directly tied to the lessons learned from every previous launch, regardless of its 
level of success. 
B. PAST TO PRESENT 
In 1994, the U.S. Air Force officially sought out replacements for their current 
fleet of space launch vehicles, primarily the Delta II, Atlas II, and Titan IV. The program 
through which these replacements would be selected is known as the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. The goal was to make launch more 
affordable and streamline processes to improve space responsiveness. In addition to 
improving commonality among vehicle components, utilizing multiple contractors would 
allow for competitiveness and create enough separation between designs that if there 
were a failure in one system then there would still be another vehicle available to 
maintain our nation’s access to space. 
Four contractors initially entered bids but, in the initial launch services contract, 
only Lockheed Martin and Boeing were awarded launches on their Atlas V and Delta IV 
vehicles. The two contractors provide similar capabilities, but the means by which they 
provide those capabilities vary greatly.   
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Some of the differences can be seen in the manufacturing and assembly processes 
and other differences can be found in the supply chain methodology chosen by each 
company. In manufacturing, Lockheed Martin chose a larger, more global approach while 
Boeing, in general, chose a more domestic approach. Also, Lockheed utilized more 
existing capabilities and relied more heavily on transporting pieces of their rockets from 
various locations than Boeing, who chose to build a consolidated manufacturing facility 
in Decatur, AL, as seen in Figure 4. Even their delivery method of finished rockets 
differed as Boeing opted to deliver over sea via the Delta Mariner, and Lockheed took to 
the skies with a Russian AN-124 Antonov, Figure 5. 
Figure 4.  EELV Manufacturing Plant, Decatur, AL. From [6]. 
Figure 5.  Delta Mariner (Left) and AN-124 Antonov (Right). From [6]. 
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With these and many other differences, the necessary supporting infrastructure 
also needed to be different. Lockheed chose a vertical integration approach, choosing to 
use a crane to lift and stack each segment of the rocket onto its launch mount. Figure 6 
shows Space Launch Complex 3 at Vandenberg AFB and pictures the facility where the 
rocket and spacecraft are integrated prior to launch. Boeing opted to assemble the rocket 
horizontally and transport it to the launch site already assembled where it is then pushed 
into a vertical position prior to the spacecraft being placed on top in preparation for 
launch.   
 
Figure 6.  Space Launch Complex 3, Vandenberg AFB, CA 
Constrained to the current launch facilities which the companies lease, major 
modifications to the launch sites as well as support facilities were needed. Power, helium, 
nitrogen, communications, and water commodities were just some of the larger resources 
that needed to be validated as capable to support the EELV family of vehicles. Almost all 
of these improvements were made in-between launch campaigns as required for each site. 
C. UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE 
Although the intention to maintain separate contractors to provide launch services 
was well thought out, there was little that could be done to prevent several issues which 
threatened both Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s space systems divisions. 
Due to a coupled decrease in demand from Department of Defense satellites and 
commercial customers, neither Boeing nor Lockheed were able to independently sustain 
their space launch service businesses without threatening the quality of the product or the  
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experienced work force which is critical to mission success. Therefore, in 2008, Boeing 
and Lockheed space launch services broke off from their parent companies and created a 
new company, United Launch Alliance. 
This new company would spend the next two years consolidating their workforces 
and optimizing every aspect of their manufacturing, transport, and launch procedures in 
order to create a long-term, sustainable business model that continues to deliver mission 
success to every one of their customers. This merger brought ripples throughout the 
commercial and Department of Defense space agencies. Never before had Boeing and 
Lockheed attempted to merge products and great care was needed to ensure that only that 
information pertaining to the launch vehicles was migrated into the new company. Since 
the Air Force had divided their acquisition and operations forces along the same lines as 
Boeing and Lockheed, the merger forced a restructuring of military launch operations and 
acquisition forces as well. The acquisition center for EELV at Los Angeles Air Force 
Base has undergone several organizational changes and each of the launch bases have 
seen shifts in the way they operate in order to match the lean practices being adopted by 
ULA. While all of this effort was slow and, at times, painful, the current operations of 
each launch vehicle did not stop. Simultaneously with manufacturing and launch efforts, 
employees from both companies were retrained or terminated and the individual 
processes of two rival companies were changed or merged into new techniques. A total of 
nine Atlas V rockets and 6 Delta IV rockets launched successfully over the initial two 
year merger timeline, all executed without a launch vehicle failure. From [6]  ULA, as 
well as the supporting DoD and civilian agencies, continue to evolve and adjust their 
force structure to meet the changing face of the industry. 
D. LAUNCH VEHICLES 
Boeing’s Delta IV family of rockets is a two-stage design with the main and upper 
stage engine coming from an American sub-contractor where Lockheed chose a Russian 
main engine for the Atlas V family. The prime factor driving the differing performance 
specifications can be attributed to use of different fuels. The Atlas V operates on RP-1, a 
form of refined petroleum, and the Delta IV uses liquid hydrogen. Similarly, both 
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families use liquid oxygen for the oxidizer and liquid hydrogen fuel in their upper stage 
engines. The upper stage engine is referred to as Centaur in the Atlas family of rockets. 
The payload capabilities for each Delta and Atlas rocket, by configuration are detailed in 
Tables 1 and 2. 
 




Price Configuration Launch Mass 
Delta IV Medium 8,600 lb 3,900 kg 
14,900 lb 
6,760 kg U.S. $70 M 
Core  
+ 4m Fairing 
349,140 lb 
158,340 kg
Delta IVM+ (4,2) 11,700 lb 5,300 kg 
20,000 lb 
9,070 kg U.S. $90 M 
Core  
+ 2 GEMS  
+ 4m Fairing 
377,990 lb 
171,420 kg 
Delta IV M+ (5,2) 9,600 lb 4,350 kg 
17,300 lb 
7,850 kg U.S. $80 M 
Core  
+ 2 GEMS  
+ 5m Fairing 
522,190 lb 
231,670 kg 
Delta IV M+ (5,4) 13,500 lb 6,120 kg 
22,700 lb 
10,300 kg U.S. $100 M 
Core  
+ 4 GEMS  
+ 5m Fairing 
522,190 lb 
231,670 kg 
Delta IV Heavy 27,400 lb 12,400 kg 
45,200 lb 
20,500 kg U.S. $140 M 
Core  
+ 2 Core Boosters  
+ 5m Fairing 
522,190 lb 
231,670 kg 









Price Configuration Launch Mass 
Atlas V 401 11,000 lb 5,000 kg --- U.S. $90 M 





Atlas V 501 9,000 lb 4,100 kg 
1,500 lb 
3,300 kg U.S. $85 M 





Atlas V 511 10,800 lb 4,900 kg 
3,900 lb 
1,750 kg U.S. $90 M 






Atlas V 521 13,200 lb 6,000 kg 
4,900 lb 
2,200 kg U.S. $95 M 






Atlas V 531 15,200 lb 6,900 kg 
6,600 lb 
3,000 kg U.S. $100 M 






Atlas V 541 16,700 lb 7,600 kg 
7,500 lb 
3,400 kg U.S. $105 M 






Atlas V 551 18,080 lb 8,200 kg 
8,200 lb 
3,750 kg U.S. $110 M 






Atlas V Heavy 30,000 lb 13,605 kg 
13,000 lb 
5,900 kg U.S. $130 M 







Table 2.    Atlas V Payload Capabilities. From [6]. 
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Both Atlas V and Delta IV utilize a common core methodology, meaning that the 
main booster for each Atlas and Delta is manufactured identically. Previous approaches 
in rocket design led to each rocket being specifically built for a given payload. In the 
EELV concept, boosters can be built without having a specific payload or mission path 
known at the time of manufacturing.   It is still necessary to match specific upper stage 
sections to specific payloads. The tables above show how the different payload 
capabilities depend upon the variant of each rocket that is required. For Delta IV rockets, 
a medium vehicle denotes a 4-meter diameter fairing and zero Graphite-Epoxy Motors 
(GEMS). Medium-plus vehicles add GEMS in pairs and may increase the size of the 
payload fairing up to 5-meters. A Delta IV Heavy vehicle is three common booster cores 
and zero GEMS.   
The Atlas V variants are named with a three number indicator. The first number 
denotes the size of the payload fairing, either 4-meter or 5-meter. The second number 
calls out the number of Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) and the third number lists the 
number of upper stage engines. As an example, an Atlas V 551 is a 5-meter payload 
fairing with five SRB’s and one upper stage engine. Because the main engine, a NPO 
Energomash RD-180, has twin exhaust, the SRB configuration can be an odd number 
without jeopardizing flight path. Figure 7 shows the Atlas V and Delta IV family of 
vehicles. 
 
Figure 7.  EELV Family of Vehicles. After [6]. 
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E. ATLAS V 501 
The necessary booster configuration for the NROL-41 mission was the Atlas V 
501. Historically, the NROL-41 mission was planned for the Delta IV launch vehicle. 
Prior to the Boeing and Lockheed merger, Boeing was found to be in violation of 
acquisition policy and misconduct in relation to the initial EELV contract proposal 
negotiation. As part of the penalty for this violation, Lockheed would be permitted build 
launch capabilities on Vandenberg AFB and three launches, NROL-41 included, which 
had previously awarded to Boeing were awarded to Lockheed Martin [7]. 
The 501 booster has several key design differences from the 400 series rockets. 
Everything from the RD-180 engine up to the Centaur Interstage Adapter (CISA) is 
identical to other variants. In the 400 series rockets, the Centaur forms the outermost 
layer of the rocket and the fairing enclosed payload, also called the Encapsulated 
Assembly (EA), is attached on top. In the 500 series, the payload fairing extends all the 
way around the Centaur and requires a Centaur Forward Load Reactor (CFLR). The 
CFLR minimizes vibrations induced on the Centaur and the larger payload fairing and is 
critical for stabilizing the rocket throughout ascent. The CFLR, payload fairing, and 
interstage adapters all separate and clear the vehicle’s path prior to spacecraft separation. 
Figure 8 shows a representative model of the 501 rocket. In the figure, the image of the 
Orbital Test Vehicle represents the payload and is not representative of the NROL-41 
payload. 
Because the NROL-41 mission was the first 5-meter Atlas V launch on SLC-3, 
physical modifications were necessary to the SLC-3 launch tower to be able to 
accommodate the larger fairing. The size of the payload required more than the sixty-
eight feet of payload space depicted in Figure 8. The details of the modifications will be 
further discussed in the Trailblazer chapter.     
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Figure 8.  Atlas V 501 Configuration. After [6]. 
In addition to NROL-41 being the first 5-meter Atlas V to launch from 
Vandenberg Air Force base, it was also the first 5-meter Atlas V to ever utilize a Lower 
Payload Module (LPM) to extend the payload fairing. Figure 9 shows the comparison of 
the 5-meter fairings with and without the LPM. 
 
Figure 9.  5.4-Meter Payload Fairing Comparison. From [6]. 
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F. SUMMARY 
This section focused on the creation of ULA and how the composition of this 
company is rooted in the history of space launch. Also included was a very high level 
overview of the different launch vehicles in the EELV family and a glimpse into how the 
launch community arrived at its current state. In addition, some differences between the 
ULA families of rockets were highlighted in order to validate how the single company 
can meet the legal obligation to maintain assured access to space. Further details of the 
Atlas V launch vehicle are provided since that was the launch vehicle utilized for the 
subject mission. The next area of research steps away from the technical aspects of 
spacelift and looks at the process by which launches are scheduled and the resultant effect 
on the production and availability of launch vehicles. 
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Despite the fact that executing EELV launch operations has been contracted out to 
commercial launch providers, the DoD remains firmly in command throughout the entire 
process. If there is one place in the EELV launch campaign where government 
involvement is most evident, it is the scheduling process.   
This chapter details the way a launch is forecasted and planned for execution. 
This portion of the overall launch program has been the slowest to change due to the fact 
that this is the area where all of the government’s competing interests meet and are 
prioritized. It has also been resistant to change because of the diverse make-up and high 
level of government and corporate leadership involved in the decision making process. 
Competing interests often mean that one agency’s launches are scheduled while others 
are delayed temporarily and are put on longer term stand-by status. Depending on the 
agency, delays can mean the difference between commercial success and failure or, for 
the government, preventing gaps in national security capabilities. 
B. NATIONAL LAUNCH FORECAST 
The launch scheduling process can begin up to ten years prior to a desired launch 
date. The entire process is led by the current 14th Air Force Commander and managed by 
Air Force Space Command. There are two phases in this process, the forecasting phase 
and the scheduling phase. The forecasting phase, which is managed using the National 
Launch Forecast (NLF), is reserved for the planning, programming, and budgeting phases 
and has no restrictions about how far out missions can be planned. The scheduling phase, 
also known as the execution phase and managed using the Current Launch Schedule 
(CLS), looks at missions planning launch in the near term. The separation point is at the 
two-year mark, as shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  NLF and CLS Planning Timing. From [8]. 
The NLF is a projection of national space launches from the Eastern and Western 
Ranges located in Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
respectively. The forecasted launches include DoD, National Reconnaissance Office, 
Civil, other government agencies, and commercial launches. The NLF is kept on the 
Launch Information Support Network (LISN) which is also managed by Air Force Space 
Command and is located at https://lisn.afspc.af.mil [8]. 
Missions are added to the NLF in one of two ways. When one of the agencies 
listed above desires a launch to be added to the NLF, they can contact Air Force Space 
Command to notify them of their launch requirements. The other method is when Air 
Force Space Command collects launch data in the form of a data call submitted to each of 
the stakeholders. These data calls are sent at least once annually, but can be more 
frequent if emerging requirements necessitate or a particular time looks to be targeted by 
multiple customers.  
Future year fiscal considerations drive the timing of this level of launch planning. 
Command leaders will gather to further refine and validate their launch requirements in 
support of the Program Objective Memorandum’s five year planning cycle in order to 
ensure the necessary funding is in place for launch vehicle procurement as well as 
provide an opportunity to lobby for their program should the fiscal environment threaten 
to jeopardize launch availability. Once the launch date approaches the two year mark, the 
mission then begins a review process for consideration to be removed from the NLF and 
added to the CLS. 
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C. CURRENT LAUNCH SCHEDULE 
Missions moving from the NLF onto the CLS mark a significant step in the 
launch campaign. It is at this point that launch vehicle manufacturing decisions are 
finalized and hardware becomes marked for a specific payload and launch date. Addition 
onto the CLS is not an automatic process; it is closely controlled and managed by the 
Current Launch Schedule Review Board (CLSRB).   
The CLSRB convenes quarterly and is chaired by the current Joint Force 
Combatant Commander (JFCC)-Space/14th Air Force Commander and is comprised of 
the Air Force Space Command Planning Directorate Chief, the Space and Missile 
Systems Center Vice Commander, the National Reconnaissance Office Director, NASA 
Director, a Federal Aviation Administration representative, facilitators from 14th Air 
Force staff, and supporting staffs of the board members. The purpose of the board is to 
assess the readiness of a mission to move into the execution phase and to handle the 
ramifications of any delays of other missions on the CLS. Emergent issues affecting the 
launch schedule or a change in national priorities can drive an out-of-cycle CLSRB to be 
convened if issues are deemed significant enough to require the highest levels of 
coordination. 
Mission readiness is not indicative of a single area of the launch, but is a 
cumulative assessment of aspects needed for mission success. This includes spacecraft 
constellation health, spacecraft requirements, assessment of the confidence that the 
spacecraft will be ready by the desired launch date, spacecraft orbit, ground equipment 
availability, spacecraft and launch vehicle funding considerations, launch vehicle 
manufacturing assessments, liens on the launch vehicle fleet, launch pad availability, 
readiness of the launch vehicle to support the desired launch date, launch range 
availability, personnel, range maintenance, supporting facilities, and any other limiting 
factors that could affect the mission flow. Figure 11 shows the CLSRB decision timeline 





Figure 11.  CLSRB Decision Points in the CLS. From [8]. 
With all of this information provided to the CLSRB, decisions can be made 
regarding the launch order, assigning launch dates, and optimizing launch opportunities. 
Those decisions produce the two year CLS and give the stakeholders their necessary 
timeframes to execute their individual missions against. 
D. DIME 
In its purest sense, the CLSRB is designed to be a place where the four elements 
of national power: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME), compete 
for available launch opportunities. The CLSRB chairperson, also an active duty three-star 
Air Force general, listens to all inputs and decides amongst multiple requests for launch 
priority. No one element is supposed to outweigh another but each facet of DIME has an 
interest in which satellites launch in a given year. Application of national priorities in this 
process is meant to protect launch opportunities of smaller stakeholders, but also give the 
authority to reprioritize the launch schedule at the last minute to support an unplanned 
national need. A review of the current CLS shows that there are twenty-two EELV 
launches planned between March of 2012 and February of 2014. Twelve of those 
launches are DoD, five are National Reconnaissance Office launches, two are 
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commercial launches and three are NASA launches. Applying the planned launches to 
the DIME model shows a disparity toward the military element. This is not surprising, 
since the EELV program is funded by the DoD, National Reconnaissance Office, and 
NASA in respective percentages, however the intent was to be able to offer launch 
opportunities to the diplomatic (foreign) and economic (commercial) elements to help 
keep the launch enterprise stable, cover the cost of the program, and allow companies or 
countries with less financial flexibility to expand into the space arena.   
Past delays to DoD, NRO, and NASA missions have shuffled the CLS so much 
that the NLF is turning into the equivalent of a five lane expressway merging into two 
lanes. There is not a fault to be placed on any of the agencies as the delays resulted from 
issues with the launch vehicles, spacecraft, and launch ranges, but the ramifications of 
those delays have resulted in a launch manifest that has no openings for the next four to 
six years. For any competing diplomatic or economic players to utilize EELV would 
require a planned launch sometime in 2016 at the earliest and would still be subject to 
prioritization through the CLSRB. 
E. IMPACTS TO INVENTORY 
Where the CLSRB has lost focus is in its pursuit of maximizing launch 
opportunities. In the eyes of the CLSRB, a launch opportunity is defined by the number 
of available launches that ULA can execute in a given twelve month period. This “launch 
opportunity” nomenclature is derived from AFSPC Instruction 10–1213 and the EELV 
contract itself where the Air Force has paid ULA for a certain number of launches in a 
year. That one contract covers all four launch pads at the two different launch bases, so 
delays in one mission have the potential to cause ripple effects in the manifest and reduce 
the number of launches realized as compared to the number of launches planned. If ULA 
launches fewer rockets than was originally planned for the year, the program managers 
refer to that difference as lost launch opportunities. Speaking strictly financially, this is 
similar to a cart pulling a horse. EELV rockets cost between $70M and $140M depending 
on the vehicle variant where a single satellite can cost between $450M and $2B. Above 
all, no one in the community is willing to accept a launch failure that results in the 
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destruction and loss of a launch vehicle and satellite, so if any aspect of the launch is not 
ready to support, there is no launch attempt. But as long as there are no failures, the 
CLSRB is left to manage missed launch opportunities as though they are failures, leading 
to unnecessary flight hardware risk. 
As previously discussed, funding and customer need has driven ULA into a force 
structure that cannot add additional launches into the calendar should a spacecraft 
problem delay a launch. The CLSRB has attempted to mitigate lost launch slots by 
stacking multiple satellites on a single launch slot and narrowing down the potential 
candidates for that slot as the launch date approaches. This poses problems on both sides 
of the launch hardware and only minimizes schedule risk slightly. For the launch vehicle, 
it delays integration of the mission specific components of the launch vehicle until the 
latest possible point in the manufacturing process. This now means that any additional 
anomalies anywhere else in the manufacturing, shipping, or assembly processes have to 
be absorbed through overtime work of the technicians or slipping the launch date, 
furthering the scheduling problem. On the satellite side, not knowing when you will 
launch keeps calibration of cameras and/or sensors on hold and threatens effectiveness of 
the satellite once it does reach orbit. In a worst case scenario for large constellation 
satellites, this could mean that there are multiple satellites aging in warehouses with no 
launch opportunity or launch vehicle available to augment on-orbit assets.   
F. SUMMARY 
The EELV launch scheduling system is designed to be very effective, but due to 
the nature of the launch business it often turns into a battleground. Different agencies 
budget and plan on different timelines meaning that some agencies get earlier access to 
contractually entering the launch manifest than others. Some agencies are backed by very 
powerful political powers and can interrupt a well-planned manifest.   
The current structure utilizing a multiple mission stacking approach has only been 
in place since 2010 and continues to evolve as the community changes to accommodate 
everyone’s launch needs. In order for the process to remain impartial and efficient, the 
launch community needs to be more open with the information pertaining to the readiness 
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of their flight hardware. The biggest issues in scheduling arise when someone is not 
forthcoming about their program issues, hoping that their team can resolve them just in 
time for launch.   
If problems are not known, missions continue to advance to the top of the priority 
list under the premise of a healthy program and when they attain that top priority, they 
then hold a launch pad or range hostage with their mission specific hardware, touting that 
the risk associated in removing their hardware outweighs the cost of additional schedule 
delays. This is another artifact of a launch manifest that has no availability or flexibility 
because giving up a launch slot today may mean you may not get another slot for several 
years. 
This chapter showed the key planning requirements and milestones achieved prior 
to any operations being executed. The planning stages last much longer then the 
operational stages, but the next chapter will show how the planning and operations 








Preparations for a launch begin years to decades before the actual launch. The 
entire planning effort starts with the satellite/constellation design. Every nut and bolt 
selected is in support of meeting the mission of the satellite and the orbit in which the 
satellite needs to operate. Even the launch vehicle and supporting infrastructure are 
carefully planned out to achieve a safe launch and delivery into orbit, and to ensure every 
need of the satellite is accounted for and ready to support the Initial Launch Capability 
(ILC) date and flight phase of the mission. 
The following chapter will break down the three month long trailblazer efforts 
that preceded the NROL-41 launch campaign. The purpose of the trailblazer was to 
ensure all processing and transportation preparations were ready for the spacecraft prior 
to the actual flight hardware showing up to Vandenberg AFB. Since the cost of the 
satellite alone was over one billion dollars, planning levels and oversight of progress 
were heavily scrutinized in order to mitigate all anticipated risk at the lowest level 
possible. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
A launch campaign trailblazer is a spacecraft driven event. Programmatically 
speaking, that means the customer must request and plan for any trailblazers at the very 
beginning of the satellite and launch planning contracts. Financially speaking, that means 
that any additional campaign costs associated with a trailblazer fall under the umbrella of 
the customer. Even though the satellite customer is responsible for paying for trailblazers, 
the trailblazer is not only a satellite focused event. It is vital to incorporate launch vehicle 
operations into trailblazer operations to ensure as many risks can be mitigated as possible.     
As previously mentioned, the goal of trailblazers is to assess supporting spacecraft 




trailblazer also provides a low risk and educational environment to train new personnel in 
payload operations or to train existing personnel on procedures that they do not normally 
use. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
The least glamorous and most critical aspect of any launch campaign comes 
before the first piece of hardware is ever manufactured. Lessons learned provide all of the 
applicable knowledge from previous, similar operations to the current operations and help 
the launch team understand all of the documented risks. Lessons learned have been 
incorporated into campaigns since the first launch campaign and the experience that ULA 
has built through Atlas and Delta operations over the years gives them a deeper tribal 
knowledge repository than any other launch contractor.   
Experience is priceless in spacelift because there is practically no room for error. 
Mistakes can cost millions of dollars each day if they result in launch delays and tens of 
millions of dollars if the flight hardware is damaged. In the case of NROL-41, 
incorporating lessons learned began with the first successful five meter mission from 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) years prior. Even though the launch sites and 
processing centers are physically different between the two launch bases, there is always 
something to be learned from utilizing previously successful techniques. Also, by 
mitigating the common risks, more attention can be focused on the unique or first-time 
portions of any procedures. 
After the NROL-41 contract was awarded, personnel who would lead operations 
at Vandenberg began travelling to CCAFS in order to shadow similar operations. 
Everything from initial hardware offloads to launch operations over several campaigns 
was witnessed. Existing CCAFS specific handling procedures were modified to fit 
Vandenberg operations instead of writing them from scratch. When unexpected 
occurrences arise during procedure execution, the lessons learned are entered into a 
database which allows the gained experience and knowledge to be incorporated into 
procedure revisions and to be shared across the launch community.   
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NROL-41 personnel not only capitalized on past missions to help achieve their 
goals, but their trailblazer execution helped shape their launch campaign and the 
campaigns of future missions. Over one hundred and twenty five lessons learned were 
documented from the trailblazer and addressed prior to the actual campaign operations. 
They covered topics from hardware to personnel safety and also sequencing of tasks to 
minimize flight hardware exposure and contamination. 
D. INFRASTRUCTURE 
The beginning of the trailblazer efforts would also mark the completion of the 
necessary infrastructure upgrades required to execute the NROL-41 mission. The SLC-3 
Mobile Service Tower (MST), encapsulated assembly transporter (KAMAG), and 
Integrated Payload Facility (IPF) represent the three largest areas of upgrade and/or 
improvement that were required to support this mission. Other improvements to HVAC, 
antenna placement, security systems, and other supporting systems were needed but will 
not be discussed in great detail in this study.   
The MST is a 286-foot tall support shelter weighing over two million pounds that 
surrounds the fixed launch platform where the Atlas V and payload are integrated and 
prepared for launch on SLC-3. The MST provides the environmental protection, platform 
access, data throughput, and integration hardware needed for every mission and, when 
required, moves away from the launch vehicle for fueling and launch operations. When 
the MST was originally upgraded for the Atlas V vehicle in 2005, 86 additional feet were 
added in conjunction with a new crane and earthquake resistant commodity systems. For 
the five meter NROL-41 mission, additional first-time configuration changes were 
needed. First was the removal of the platforms from the payload access levels of the 
MST. These platforms were initially designed and installed for the smaller, four meter 
payloads which preceded the NROL-41 mission. They were re-installed following 
launch, but required additional attention due to the nature of risk in first-time operations. 
Also, due to the size difference of the encapsulated assembly, the gaseous hydrogen vent 
was relocated and additional accesses were added to the environmental doors for HVAC 
lines to supply clean, forced air into the encapsulated assembly.    
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The Fixed Umbilical Tower (FUT) is shown in Figure 12 and is adjacent to the 
MST on SLC-3. As the name suggests, the FUT does not move at any time and houses 
the conduits for electrical power, fuel, oxidizers, non-transmitting data cables, and 
associated personnel access. Part of the roof of the FUT was designed and built before the 
concept of a five meter payload was realized; therefore that section of the roof of the FUT 
had to be removed in order for the larger encapsulated assembly to safely traverse into 
the MST for integration. Once the assembly was successfully integrated onto the launch 
vehicle, the roof could then be reattached as it posed no launch risk.   
 
Figure 12.  Fixed Umbilical Tower Roof on SLC-3 
The next major infrastructure hurdle in the campaign had to do with power. The 
mission requirement for power is that there must be two, independent sources of power 
available for the SLC. Vandenberg AFB is capable of meeting this requirement with 
commercial power and the South Vandenberg Power Plant (SVPP). Every mission needs 
to validate and test the power configuration prior to launch whether or not they utilize 
trailblazers during the campaign. Power became a very tumultuous area because 




NROL-41 trailblazers and mission. A several thousand acre fire decimated many of the 
power lines over the entire base and the four power transformers which reside on South 
Vandenberg all failed within six months of each other. Because these transformers are 
twelve month lead-time items to replace, spare generators and transformers had to be 
brought in to support test and launch operations. Figure 13 shows the desired power 
configuration for launch operations at SLC-3. The figure shows how, nominally, 
commercial power is supported through a combination of one of four transformers and 
one of three physical lines. SVPP power is generated through two of five generators 
alone one of two lines. As a result of the fire and transformer shortages, both commercial 
and SVPP power were only available through one transformer or generator and one 
physical line each.   
 
Figure 13.  NROL-41 Electrical Power Configuration 
The final major support modifications that will be reported were to the KAMAG 
transporter. This piece of hardware is specifically designed to transport an encapsulated 
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assembly from a spacecraft processing facility to the launch site. For NROL-41, a 
secondary environmental control system, back-up generators, and all new hydraulic hoses 
had to be added to the transporter prior to the trailblazer. Figure 14 shows the trailblazer 
encapsulated assembly on the KAMAG. 
 
Figure 14.  KAMAG with Encapsulated Assembly 
E. TRAILBLAZERS 
There were two separate trailblazers that were executed in support of NROL-41, 
an electrical trailblazer and a mechanical trailblazer. The electrical trailblazer’s primary 
purpose was to test the connectivity of several types of lines from the payload back down 
to the support infrastructure. The secondary objective was to install additional power 
systems throughout spacecraft support facilities on the launch pad. There was no flight 
hardware involved, but representative support equipment was brought in to verify 
configurations and operations. Some of the verifications validated the power connections 
that are in the support rooms and up on the payload levels while others involved pushing 
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large amounts of data across the Vandenberg AFB data lines to check data latency from 
the payload support areas to the launch control centers. Since NROL-41 has a classified 
mission, the lines being used for data transmission also had to be certified and accredited 
for the level of classification required of the mission. 
An electrical trailblazer is conducted for every mission, regardless of size and 
typically lasts about two weeks. After the electrical trailblazer, any site modifications or 
electrical lines are considered locked until after the launch and may not be manipulated or 
modified without re-accomplishing the electrical trailblazer tests again.   
The mechanical trailblazer for NROL-41 had many more goals than the electrical 
trailblazer and required a great deal more support than any other EELV trailblazer that 
was ever accomplished at Vandenberg. The overarching goal was to rehearse every step 
in the launch campaign from spacecraft arrival at Vandenberg until encapsulated 
assembly mate to the launch vehicle. In addition to these planned campaign operations, 
the teams would exercise the de-mate procedures and transports back to the satellite 
processing facility as a precautionary measure should the need arise during the real 
campaign. 
The trailblazer began on March 11, 2009 with preparations at the Integrated 
Payload Facility (IPF) on south Vandenberg Air Force Base. The IPF at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base is a remnant from the attempted space shuttle program from the 1980s. The 
facility was designed with three large bays which, at full capacity, would have been able 
to simultaneously service three shuttle payloads and then transition them up and out of 
the facility for loading onto a space shuttle. Because the space shuttle mission was never 
executed in California, the IPF was converted by an independent contractor for use as a 
flexible spacecraft processing facility available for any customer. As it stands today, only 
one bay is utilized for health monitoring and fueling of spacecraft while the other two are 
able to house other pieces of flight hardware. In the case of NROL-41, those inert bays 
were used for storing each half of the payload fairing after arrival and assembly on the 
IPF floor.   
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Actual flight payload fairings were not used for the trailblazer. Instead, a 
prototype set of fairings were manufactured to use to validate these critical operations. 
Although these fairings would never be used for flight, they were identical to the flight 
units in every aspect relating to the launch vehicle interfaces. Size, shape, assembly 
hardware, and weight all matched, ensuring the exercise would produce valid results. 
Figure 15 is a picture of the two segments of one half of the payload fairing inside the 
cleaning bay of the IPF after arrival to Vandenberg Air Force Base via Antanov AN-124 
aircraft, transport from the airfield to the IPF via convoy, and prior to contamination 
cover removal. 
 
Figure 15.  Payload Fairing Inside of IPF near SLC-6 
After unwrapping and cleaning of the hardware, the pieces were moved into the 
clean room portion of the IPF. Mirroring the actual mission flow, each half of the payload 
fairing was transported and assembled separately then stored vertically before the 
spacecraft simulator arrived. The left half of Figure 16 is an image capture from the 
simulation model used to plan out the IPF operations. It shows the point after final fairing 
erection and spacecraft arrival as the encapsulation is occurring. The right half of Figure 
16 shows the most difficult point in the operation where four technicians were staged 
vertically over each other on each side of the fairing so that all eight turnbuckles (four per 
side) could be attached and tightened simultaneously ensuring a flush and exact mate. 
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Figure 16.  Spacecraft Encapsulation. After [9]. 
In this simulation, the spacecraft shape is generic and not representative of the 
actual spacecraft due to security classifications. The technicians worked on scaffolding 
and man lifts that were positioned around the flight hardware and in close proximity to 
the facility walls and doors. This procedure alone would have warranted a trailblazer 
effort due to the scope of resources involved and the precise nature of each step required 
to execute without damage to the hardware.   
All support equipment used was true and actual equipment needed for the actual 
launch campaign. One particularly valuable lesson learned about the support equipment 
occurred when handling the drive wheel units (DWU) that allow the fairings to be moved 
along the floor during assembly and encapsulation. Several DWU’s are mounted to the 
fairing skeleton allowing relatively few operators to lift and move the fairings into their 
needed position. While preparing to move a DWU from its storage mount, a technician 
inadvertently caused the DWU to tip and damage the unit and facility. Figure 17 shows 
the proper use of a DWU on the left as well as two pictures of the fallen unit in the center 
and right.   
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Figure 17.  Drive Wheel Unit Incident 
This incident necessitated the damaged unit be sent back to the manufacturer for 
repair and a new DWU be shipped to Vandenberg. Operationally, the incident caused a 
several day delay to processing. Had the incident occurred during the mission, it would 
have impacted the launch date while the team waited for a replacement to arrive on 
location and risked satellite health because every satellite has components which can only 
be out of a vacuum environment for a limited amount of time before returning to the 
manufacturer for re-calibration. Delays like these can cost a program tens of thousands of 
dollars to overcome and validate the requirement for rehearsals. 
For the NROL-41 trailblazer, an equivalent sized and shaped simulator was used 
instead of a real satellite. In terms of security and sensitivity, it was treated exactly as the 
real hardware, but the use of a simulated spacecraft provided a buffer in case anything 
anomalous occurred throughout the trailblazer. In addition to security benefits, the 
trailblazer could be executed in parallel with actual spacecraft manufacturing and testing.   
Physical procedures were not the only procedures planned and rehearsed during 
the trailblazer. The point when the spacecraft transport team delivered the spacecraft 
simulator to the processing facility marked the official handoff point for leadership of the 
mission processing from the spacecraft vehicle team to the launch vehicle team. While 
ownership and overall responsibility never leave the mission payload team, daily 
operations and handling would transition as the satellite was moved for encapsulation. 
While seemingly innocuous, practicing handoff of operations benefits the entire team by 
reducing confusion about who is making final decisions during any anomalous events.   
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This handoff is standard in any mission and needs to be exercised because the 
individual satellite manufacturers are not used to handing over control of their hardware. 
The launch vehicle contractors are experienced in working with their encapsulation 
hardware and facilities but the satellite contractor have spent years leading the 
development and manufacturing of the satellite. It is understandable that there could be 
friction amongst the team during this time, so rehearsing has non-material value in 
addition to the hardware risk reductions. 
F. TRANSPORTATION, LIFT, AND MATE REHEARSAL 
The complete set of encapsulation procedures concluded successfully on April 28, 
2009 with the assembly being removed from the IPF for transport to the launch site. As 
was described above, each individual piece of the encapsulated assembly was transported 
horizontally and arrived in stages through the front door of the facility. Once assembled, 
the assembly stood sixty five feet tall vertically and could not be transported out the front 
of the IPF. The IPF was designed this way and includes a separate crane and transfer 
tower that lift the EA out of the clean room and then out the back of the IPF where the 
transporter was stationed. 
The procedure is simple to conceptualize, but significantly more complex to 
execute. This was the largest encapsulated assembly ever processed at the IPF and 
custom lifting slings and rigging were required to articulate the assembly out of the 
building. The sensitivity of any satellite means very little room for errors of any kind, but 
the size of this assembly meant that room for error was minimal during transfers. There 
were less than three inches of clearance as the assembly transitioned from the clean room 
up into the transfer tower and less than twelve inches of clearance on each side of the 
assembly when moving out of the transfer tower door to the outside of the facility. Figure 
18 shows the limited clearance during the clean room to transfer tower transition. 
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Figure 18.  Clean Room to Transfer Tower Clearance 
Figure 18 also shows technicians holding guide ropes to eliminate swing in the assembly 
during lifting. The guide ropes made the transition out of the facility possible because of 
swirling Pacific Ocean winds trying to swing the assembly into the facility walls. Figure 
19 shows the encapsulated assembly just prior to lifting (left) and just prior to mating to 
the KAMAG transporter (right). 
 
Figure 19.  Encapsulated Assembly Inside of IPF and KAMAG Mating 
Preparation for any flight hardware transport is substantial and began a month 
prior to first movement for every transport on/across Vandenberg. Some of the 
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preparations include procedure reviews, route surveys, weather analysis, security, convoy 
escort planning, road closures, contingency planning and individual transport personnel 
training. The preparation only guaranteed the ability to attempt to move the encapsulated 
assembly. There were also wind, humidity, and temperature restrictions that had to be 
met at the IPF, along the transport route, and at the launch site. Primary and secondary 
portable environmental systems had to operate as needed and base power systems had to 
operate in non-standard configurations to provide redundant power strings to the lifting 
cranes. 
After overcoming the clearance and weather issues, the convoy was able to 
proceed to the launch site. The convoy was composed of eleven vehicles which moved at 
three miles per hour and took three hours to complete. Two scheduled satellite and 
KAMAG systems health checks were executed along the route to ensure the environment 
inside of the encapsulated assembly remained inside of limits and also to validate that the 
transport itself was not damaging the sensitive systems. 
Planning and performing every step correctly and efficiently was paramount to 
risk mitigation as well as success because there was a finite amount of time the 
encapsulated assembly was allowed to be on the KAMAG transporter. The environment 
needed to keep the satellite healthy is best achieved in a clean room and creating that 
environment while moving down a road required portable nitrogen, helium, and oxygen 
systems in addition to sustainable vehicle power. The sensitivity of this operation shows 
another critical reason the trailblazer was needed. By using a spacecraft simulator and 
actual mission support equipment, any catastrophic event could be analyzed and 
corrected without jeopardizing the mission. Lessons learned from this trailblazer 
transport showed the mission team that additional portable environmental control systems 
were needed and that the support team needed to be expanded from the original estimate. 
Those systems were built and additional personnel were ready in time for NROL-41’s 
actual transport to the launch pad. 
The L-41 trailblazer not only mitigated risk against itself during the lifting 
operation, but also against other mission flight hardware. Because launch operations are 
year-round, the lifting crane and launch tower at Space Launch Complex - Three were in 
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use by another mission. The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) was 
preparing for their eighteenth launch while the L-41 trailblazer was being executed and 
the launch vehicle for the DMSP-18 mission was in place when the lifting operations 
occurred. Both the L-41 and DMSP-18 missions had seen lengthy delays in satellite 
manufacturing and mission execution prior to the L-41 lifting event, so tensions were 
elevated when the NRO coordinated to lift and hold an encapsulated satellite simulator on 
a crane over the booster owned by another organization. Figure 20 shows the planned 
simulation booster combined with actual images of the DMSP-18 booster. To increase 
assurance that there would be no risk to flight hardware, ULA subcontracted out work to 
laser image the entire mobile service tower for exact measurements inside the facility. 
This was extremely beneficial for operations planning and risk mitigation and helped the 
leadership of all agencies understand the scope of the operation and that everything 
possible was being done to ensure the safety of personnel and hardware.   
 
Figure 20.  Planning image of L-41 EA over DMSP-18 Booster 
 Lifting procedures were not as simple as lifting straight up and in to the mobile 
service tower. A series of precise bridge and trolley maneuvers were necessary to 
maneuver around permanent structures to successfully navigate into the tower. Spotters 
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were placed throughout the facility on multiple levels and utilized hand gestures, radio 
communications, and guide ropes to ensure the encapsulated assembly did not contact 
any of the facility structures. Given the size, weight, and height above the ground, this 
was the most risky portion of the operation and planning details literally went down to 
the inch. When the simulator moved into the tower, the closest clearance to the tower 
during entry was less than ten inches. There were fewer than twelve inches between the 
simulator and the DMSP-18 booster when the assembly was in its final position prior to 
back out. The DMSP-18 booster was a four meter fairing mission, so the mating 
procedure could not be exercised during the trailblazer. Even though mating was 
simulated, the team exercised the environmental control system changeover from 
portable to tower controls. Knowing the sensitivity of any satellite, environmental control 
can actually be more dangerous than physical mating to the rocket.    
A series of planning images from the top and the front used to show clearances of 
the assembly when entering the tower are shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.  Mobile Service Tower Clearance Planning. After [9]. 
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The reverse procedures closed out the operation on May 2, 2009 and the 
encapsulated assembly went through equal scrutiny and care on the lift out of the tower, 
lowering back onto the KAMAG transporter, and transport back to the payload 
processing facility for de-capsulation rehearsal. De-capsulation is a series of procedures 
that no one wants to use, but if needed, they would have been the most contentious to  
get approved if not previously exercised during this trailblazer. Since de-capsulation was 
not needed for the actual launch campaign it will not be discussed in detail here, but it 
should be known that the procedures took another twenty days of full team participation 
to fully vet. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter detailed the efforts of the satellite and launch teams through the 
completion of prerequisite requirements in support of the NROL-41 launch. Since the 
mission launched successfully on the first attempt, the team ended up not needing to use 
the de-capsulation procedures but not having the steps and plans ready if needed would 
have proved disastrous to the flight hardware and added confusion to a tenuous situation.   
The inclusion of trailblazers in the launch campaign are not required or mandated 
for any mission, but are often opted for when the mission is of high enough importance or 
if the procedures call for high risk, first time operations. Both high mission importance 
and first time operations were prevalent in the NROL-41 campaign, thus the mission 
director wisely included and executed the events. Utilizing the trailblazer on the NROL-
41 mission not only reduced hardware risk to the mission equipment, but afforded the 
different teams an opportunity to develop and optimize communication paths that would 
minimize unforeseen personality or chain of command issues when the actual flight 
hardware arrived. 
As has been previously discussed, the cost of launch campaigns is high, but it is 
that way for a reason. Classification and proprietary issues prevent the publication of 
exact cost breakdowns for the trailblazer, but it is easy to see the magnitude of the cost 
when you count in trailblazer unique, five-meter payload fairings at over ten million 
dollars, rental of a commercial spacecraft processing facility and clean room, including 
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facility operators for three months plus preparation and clean-up time, launch vehicle, 
satellite vehicle, government mission assurance, and contractor mission assurance teams 
for three months plus planning and clean-up time, and the multitude of trailblazer specific 
support pieces required to validate operational techniques. Such costs can be staggering 
and increasingly difficult to justify as missions continue to succeed. Regardless, the costs 
are necessary to assure mission success and protection of hardware with unquantifiable 
amounts of strategic capability. 
There is no doubt that the precision at which the NROL-41 campaign operated 
was a direct result from the time, money, and effort spent in the trailblazer campaign. 
Without the trailblazer, the launch teams would have been ill-equipped to handle the 
anomalies of the actual launch campaign while simultaneously mitigating the known 
risks. This chapter detailed one of the major steps needed to make a launch a success and 
the next chapter shows that completion of the trailblazer left no doubt or hesitation during 
the execution of the launch campaign. 
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V. LAUNCH CAMPAIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
Execution of launch processing and day of launch operations are all preceded by 
the planning of the mission, building the components, and preparing procedures and 
personnel. Over a decade of work by hundreds of people from dozens of companies and 
organizations as well as billions of dollars lead up to the single task of launch.   
The following chapter will detail the major milestones of the launch campaign at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base. The launch base is a significant location not just because it 
is the launch point, but because the primary launch control centers and hardware 
processing all occurs close to the launch site. These events began with flight hardware 
arrival, continued with rehearsals and integration, and eventually led to the successful 
launch of the NROL-41 rocket. 
B. HARDWARE ARRIVAL 
As part of the mission assurance program, all flight hardware goes through 
multiple inspections and acceptance tests even before transport to the launch site. The 
most scrutinized components of the launch vehicle are the engines. The Energomash RD-
180 engine for the booster and the Pratt and Whitney RL-10 engine for the upper stage 
each are reviewed during and after manufacturing to assure proper operation. The highest 
standards are adhered to during manufacturing, but even though the contractors have 
great track records, government civilian aerospace engineers and active duty military 
engineers and program managers provide additional layers of quality control by 
performing hardware acceptance reviews before the engines are integrated into the 
vehicles. These reviews consist primarily of documentation verification of the assembly 
steps and part manufacturing procedures. Reviews also ensure that the contractor quality 
assurance processes have been followed and positive control documentation throughout 
the assembly line is archived in case it is needed at a later date. Prior to the engine being 
shipped to the launch vehicle manufacturing facility, no fewer than six individual 
organizations performed tip to tail reviews of each engine. 
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NROL-41’s booster and Centaur assembly were historical due to the fact that they 
were the final components to be built and delivered from the Lockheed Martin facilities 
in Denver, Colorado. As part of the United Launch Alliance process improvements, Atlas 
V manufacturing operations were in the process of being transitioned to the Decatur, 
Alabama plant where the Delta II and Delta IV rockets are manufactured.   
Prior to the establishment of ULA, Lockheed Martin built Atlas V boosters in 
Denver, Colorado and their Centaur’s were built in San Diego, California. After the 
structures were built, engine integration and test along with final assembly were 
performed and then the stages were prepared for shipment via Antanov AN-124 from 
Colorado to whichever launch base the mission required. Today, ULA manufactures all 
stages of their launch vehicles in Decatur, Alabama and has the option of transporting the 
stages via air on the Antanov or via water on the Mariner. Payload fairings are built by a 
subcontractor and, depending on which size is required for the mission, can be 
transported either by plane or by truck.   
The major flight hardware arrivals for NROL-41 consisted of the booster, 
Centaur, payload fairings, and cylindrical interstage adapters. The booster, Centaur, and 
payload fairings all arrived on the Antanov AN-124 while the cylindrical adapters arrived 
at Vandenberg Air Force Base on trucks. In order to offload the hardware from the 
Antanov, ULA utilizes a mobile track system that attaches to the ramp of the airplane. 
After the track system is assembled, the hardware can then transition off the plane, Figure 
22, and is then transported to the appropriate processing facility.   
 
Figure 22.  Booster Offload at Vandenberg Air Force Base 
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Figure 22 shows two images of the NROL-41 booster being offloaded from the Antanov. 
Similar operations were executed for the Centaur and payload fairing arrivals. Once at 
their respective processing facilities, the hardware was inspected and prepared for 
integration at the launch site. 
 The NROL-41 hardware arrival was not perfectly smooth. The Centaur Interstage 
Adapter (CISA) was transported by truck from Harlingen, Texas. Upon receipt and 
inspection it was found that part of the container structure detached during transport and 
struck the adapter. Figure 23 shows the CISA with the container contacting the adapter. 
 
Figure 23.  Centaur Interstage Adapter Damage 
The CISA is a single piece composite which, if not flight worthy, would have 
delayed launch by four to six months minimum. X-ray’s and a full non-destructive 
inspection were accomplished and engineers from the manufacturer, ULA, the Air Force, 
and both the satellite and launch vehicle program offices reviewed the damage and 
inspection findings before determining that the damage was contained to the outer skin 
only. An issue like this is an example of the immense attention to detail required to assure 
the safety of the satellite being launched.    
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Figure 24 shows a graphical representation of the hardware arrival flow all the 
way from arrival at Vandenberg through acceptance and integration, and concluding with 
test and assembly at the launch site.   
 
Figure 24.  Flight Hardware Arrival and Processing Flow. From[6]. 
Figure 24 also shows all possible hardware arrival methods for both the Atlas and 
Delta launch vehicles. For the NROL-41 mission the Delta Mariner was not utilized, 
there were no Solid Rocket Boosters, and there were also no conical shaped interstage 
adapters. 
C. LAUNCH REHEARSALS 
Preparations for the day of launch are not a serial in nature. The actual launch 
teams who will execute day of launch operations participate in rehearsals in parallel with 
satellite and launch vehicle transports and deliveries. The primary vehicle for a mission 
director to gauge the team’s readiness for launch is the Integrated Crew Exercise (ICE). 
An ICE is best described as practice for launch day. Over the course of fifty years, many 
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anomalies have been seen while trying to launch a rocket. Since there is no way to be 
prepared for every contingency and not enough time to practice every anomaly ever 
experienced, ICE’s take the launch procedure and inject the most recent and most 
common types of anomalies randomly to evaluate how the launch team handles 
problems. Launches themselves must be initiated at very specific dates and times in order 
for the satellite to reach its intended orbit. Small anomalies handled poorly can result in 
the loss of a launch opportunity and add unnecessary risk to mission hardware. The 
NROL-41 mission programmed two ICE’s and one Mission Dress Rehearsal (MDR). The 
only difference between an ICE and a MDR is that the MDR is executed at the true and 
actual time that the real launch will begin. This is another key preparation technique since 
the launch countdown is over six hours long and, in the case of NROL-41, took place 
through the night. 
The anomalies induced in a rehearsal can include problems with the booster, 
satellite, individual communication methods, building evacuations, natural disasters, 
support equipment failures, or anything else appropriate to test the resilience of the 
launch team. Rehearsals are developed by dedicated personnel who work every single 
launch and leverage that experience to build the most realistic scenarios. These personnel 
are on the Rehearsal Anomaly Team (RAT) and incorporate lessons learned from past 
rehearsals and missions to not only have appropriate anomalies, but to time those 
anomalies so they challenge the launch affectivity as well as crew responsiveness.   
Three anomalies may seem redundant, but the team responsible for a launch is 
made up of many government personnel who rotate in and out of positions so they are not 
as familiar with the launch procedures as the contractors who have been performing 
launches for decades. In addition to training new members, rehearsals are an absolute 
necessity due to the complicated communication structure that is needed to ensure all 
appropriate agencies can review and concur with any anomaly resolution or major 
milestone decision. The NROL-41 communication chain is shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.  NROL-41 Launch Management Team 
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Figure 25 shows the complexity of launch day communication but it only shows 
part of the situation. Many of the blocks in the diagram above represent one person, but 
others represent upwards of fifty people all supporting a single function or organization. 
A specific example is the very bottom blue box on the right labeled SPO/AGO Tech 
Team which encompasses two separate control rooms and approximately forty personnel.   
Launch rehearsals stressed and tested the launch team throughout the launch 
campaign and increased in complexity each time. The first Integrated Crew Exercise was 
accomplished on 18 March 2010, prior to the booster being placed on the launch site. The 
second ICE was completed on 8 June 2010 and the Mission Dress Rehearsal took place 
on 28 August 2010, less than thirty days before the planned launch date of NROL-41. 
D. INTEGRATION AND TEST 
After flight hardware receipt and inspection at Vandenberg, the integration of the 
vehicle at the launch site began in earnest. As previously discussed, the Atlas V is 
integrated in place at the launch site from the ground up. The booster was the first piece 
delivered to the launch site and was fixed to the launch mounts after being rotated 
vertically by the sixty ton crane located on SLC-3. After the booster was in place, the two 
main interstage adapters were stacked over the booster. Figure 26 shows the Booster 
Interstage Adapter being lifted and mated onto the booster at SLC-3. 
 
Figure 26.  Booster Interstage Adapter Mate 
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On the following day, the Centaur Interstage Adapter was lifted and mated to the 
Booster Interstage Adapter. Figure 27 shows the lift and mate of the CISA to the BISA. 
 
Figure 27.  Centaur Interstage Adapter Mate 
The milestone of “Booster on Stand” is used to delineate when every major 
component except for the payload has been integrated at the launch site. This is attained 
after the Centaur mate (shown in Figure 28) and boattail and was accomplished on  
14 May 2010.   
 
Figure 28.  Centaur Mate 
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On a four meter booster, the encapsulated spacecraft is mated directly to the top 
of the Centaur. For a five meter fairing, a base module surrounds the Centaur and a CFLR 
is installed to partially distribute the weight of the spacecraft and fairings and to eliminate 
shifting loads during flight. Figure 29 shows the CFLR prior to mate and the base module 
being lowered over the CFLR and onto the Centaur. 
 
Figure 29.  Centaur Forward Load Reactor and Base Module 
Once the booster was integrated at the launch site, the final major test prior to 
permitting the spacecraft to be encapsulated and transported to the launch site is 
executed. The Wet Dress Rehearsal (WDR) is the operation used to validate that all 
integration has been done correctly and the vehicle is prepared to move into the final 
launch procedures. In the WDR, the booster is fueled exactly as it will be for launch and 
held at maximum fueling for a predetermined amount of time while communications 
between the booster and the launch range are tested. By holding the vehicle at maximum 
fuel levels for longer than planned the vehicle is showing it can withstand any minor 
delays on the true day of launch and the communication checks verify that the launch 
range can maintain control of the vehicle during the most volatile period of the 
countdown. Figure 30 shows the NROL-41 booster after the Mobile Service Tower has 




Figure 30.  Wet Dress Rehearsal at SLC-3 
After successfully completing the Wet Dress Rehearsal, final spacecraft 
encapsulation procedures were allowed to proceed as planned. The encapsulation of the 
spacecraft occurred exactly as it did during the trailblazer and the booster was prepared to 
receive the satellite which was completed six days after the completion of WDR. 
Spacecraft transport and mate were twenty-four hour straight operations and took place 
on 3 September 2010. As described in the Trailblazer chapter, the transport and mate was 
an orchestrated operation spanning multiple government agencies and a tremendous 
amount of oversight as the satellite moved from its processing facility onto the launch 
vehicle. The additional environmental control systems required to be added to the 
KAMAG for transport can be seen in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31.  Modified KAMAG Transporter 
The transport from the spacecraft processing facility was uneventful and so was 
the lift and mate onto the launch vehicle. Figure 32 shows the encapsulated assembly 
being lifted (left) and the lowering of the encapsulated assembly just prior to mating to 
the base module (right). 
 
Figure 32.  Encapsulated Assembly Mate 
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The encapsulated assembly mate marked the final major mechanical test. The 
final system test that is needed prior to launch is called the Integrated System Test (IST). 
IST is a complete communications health check for both the launch vehicle and the 
satellite. This is the first chance that the satellite team has to interact with the launch 
range systems and the satellite simultaneously and is also the final milestone prior to 
launch readiness reviews across every single organization that has a role on the day of 
launch. Launch Readiness Reviews (LRR) brief the top executives, stakeholders, and 
commanders that all operational steps prior to launch, all risk mitigation steps, and all 
procedure reviews are complete and that their areas of responsibility are ready to proceed 
to launch. All of these industry and government leaders who hold reviews participate in 
launch day and are the responsible parties who will have to answer if there are any 
significant problems on the day of launch. The first readiness reviews began two days 
after IST and the final review took place seven days later on 17 September 2010. 
E. DAY OF LAUNCH 
On 19 September 2010, the launch team arrived at their respective control centers 
to prepare the vehicle for launch. Exactly as the rehearsals were executed, the day of 
launch countdown began seven hours prior to the launch window opening. The procedure 
itself includes over four hundred individual actions that were completed on the exact 
minute they were planned in order to support meeting the launch timeline. Multiple 
vehicle systems execute power-on and other preparation steps in parallel to meet the 
major polling steps in the launch procedure. There are three critical times during the 
count when all system operators must be ready to proceed to that major step. They are 
when the Mobile Service Tower rolls away from the launch vehicle, when cryogenic 
tanking operations begin, and when the vehicle is about to proceed into the final two 
minutes of the launch. Figure 33 shows the launch vehicle as the nine million pound MST 
rolls away from the vehicle. 
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Figure 33.  Mobile Service Tower Roll 
As the figure shows, there are many technicians still working near the vehicle up 
until the vehicle is ready to begin cryogenic tanking. Due to the danger associated with 
liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, no personnel of any kind are on the launch site while 
cryogenics are flowing to the vehicle. In the event of an anomaly, teams are near the 
launch site that would enter if needed, but that eventuality is a last resort and was not 
required for any portion of the NROL-41 countdown. Figure 34 shows the launch vehicle 
during cryogenic tanking as taken by one of the remote cameras on the launch site. 
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Figure 34.  Cryogenic Tanking Prior to Launch 
In the procedure are planned hold periods where paperwork or anomalies could 
have been completed if necessary. For the NROL-41 countdown, no significant 
anomalies were encountered and the launch vehicle successfully lifted off from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base early in the morning of 20 September 2010.   
Figure 35 shows the notional flight path that the vehicle took along with the times 
that the stages of the rocket separated, placing the satellite within meters of its planned 
insertion point. After spacecraft separation from the upper stage, the Centaur was ignited 
again for re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere. Not every upper stage re-enters the earth’s 
atmosphere as past missions have sent the Upper stage on a collision orbit with the moon 
or the sun, but due to the remaining fuel on board and the lack of scientific utility at the 
time, the upper stage was returned in an effort to minimize space junk in polar orbit 
inclinations. 
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Figure 35.  NROL-41 Flight Profile. From [10]. 
 The launch team stands down operations at spacecraft separation and satellite 
operators then begin their health checks and put the satellite into service. Because of the 
classified mission of NROL-41, details cannot be discussed here, but the commanders of 
the satellite reported back to the launch team their sincere thanks that the mission was 
accomplished with no issues and with no damage to the satellite. 
F. SUMMARY 
The launch campaign and day of launch act as culminating points for long days 
and weeks of work by a multitude of organizations. In addition to mission specific issues, 
the launch team at Vandenberg had to address Atlas V fleet problems as well as juggling 
opposing missions on Vandenberg for range assets.   
The mission detailed in the previous chapter could have been much less 
successful at numerous points, but thanks to the quality of work performed and the 
caliber of people responsible for the work required, many issues were handled at a level 
which did not induce impacts to the launch schedule 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis detailed the steps taken to assure the success of the NROL-41 launch. 
Research began with a look at how the launch community has evolved from multiple 
launch contractors and has arrived at its current state of a combination of launch vehicle 
families.   
A review of the launch scheduling process and trailblazer efforts showed how the 
duration of a launch campaign can span into multiple years. The depth of technical 
expertise and experience required to execute these operations efficiently are a significant 
contributor to the high costs of spacelift but are necessary for mission success. 
Performing launch operations faster and at lower costs only opens the door to riskier 
execution of procedures and potential damage to valuable flight hardware.   
With satellite costs alone of over one billion, two hundred million dollars and 
over ten years of design and manufacturing, the NROL-41 launch campaign and 
preparations appropriately protected the investments made and today’s national security 
continues to reap the benefits of the NROL-41 asset. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The highest recommendations for maintaining vigilant mission assurance cannot 
be understated. In this medium, it is not possible to capture every mission assurance 
aspect of the NROL-41 launch campaign. Critics continue to seek cuts in spending and a 
mission like NROL-41 can build arguments for both sides of the case. By looking at all 
of the data from this mission, it is clear that the experience and depth of assurance is why 
success was all but certain. Maintaining the current levels of mission assurance is the best 
path forward to help assure future missions are equally successful.   
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Figure 36.  NROL-41 Launch Photo 
Another recommendation would be to build a military career field specifically for 
the launch of satellites. Currently, space launch cadre members are drawn from nuclear 
missile maintainers, missile operators, and acquisition officers. By the time any of them 
become adequately proficient in launch operations it is time for them to transition to non-
related assignments. There is current Air Force methodology that desires Airmen with 
breadth across multiple areas rather than depth in a single field. Since the value of space 
assets are the highest in the Department of Defense, there would be value in cultivating a 
career field that could be dedicated to the spacelift field in order to help improve 
operations. 
Maintaining mission assurance in the current community is clearly critical to 
mission success, but the current experience pool cannot provide launch services forever. 
Launch providers have been tasked with reducing budgets while missions have been 
reduced or cancelled altogether. Educating a new generation of competent spacelift 
operators is a task that must begin today. The current operators gained their experience 
by performing launch operations and since the launch rate is less than a tenth what it was 
at the beginning of the spacelift era, we must leverage that experience before it is lost. 
Increasing personnel for training may seem redundant and an unnecessary cost, but there 
 63
is only a small window to train alongside the most successful generation of launch 
operators and today’s train-as-you-go methods look good for the budget, but place one of 
a kind hardware at unacceptable levels of risk.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A recommended approach to study this topic further would be to analyze a 
competitor launch campaign and compare track records and costs to see if equal certainty 
can be attained at a lower cost. The down side is that there are not a lot of commercial 
launch agencies with government contracts, but similar studies could be extrapolated 
against a civilian payload. Again, it would not be an equal comparison because the 
physical size, capabilities, and cost of civilian satellites do not come close to the satellites 
built under Department of Defense contracts. The newest competitor for government 
contracts is SpaceX, so if research was done on one of their launches it would also be 
appropriate to explore where the expertise in that company originated as many employees 
transitioned during the initial creation of ULA when the company eliminated redundant 
positions. 
Another area to research would be the different contracting vehicles used in the 
overall launch process. The largest area of concern in the NROL-41 launch campaign was 
work that was deferred from the manufacturing plant and completed at the launch site in 
order to save schedule. The work performed at the launch site is compensated under 
different methods than the contract which purchased the flight hardware. Studies could be 
done on the performance of the manufacturing contracts against the launch services 
contracts.  
EELV contracts are expensive for many reasons; one reason is because of the 
heavy government involvement combined with constant personnel changes. A ten year 
satellite manufacturing period equates to at least four different program manager 
rotations. This means redundant training and opportunities for poor continuity. Launch 
squadrons swap personnel on average every two years. For Vandenberg personnel, that 
averages two launches executed before changing roles. It would be beneficial to study the 
entire military turnover in the life of a satellite and determine how much additional work 
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is placed on satellite and launch vehicle contractors to contend with those changing 
government positions. Additional personnel research could be done to see if building a 
cadre of launch professionals would be better for the launch community than moving 
Airmen in between nuclear missile maintenance and spacelift communities. 
If lowering costs is a high priority then the unfortunate truth is large, sweeping 
changes would be required. Economics proves that to lower costs either purchased 
volume would need to increase or infrastructure needs to be reduced. Since today’s 
economic situations do not lend themselves to purchasing more launch vehicles or 
building more launch facilities, that leaves reductions. In the spacelift world, reductions 
would have to come from rehearsals and layers of government involvement. In the launch 
campaign chapter, the readiness review process shows that a large amount of time and 
resources are spent explaining anomalies or basic operations to agencies that are not 
familiar with the mission, but have a responsibility tied to them in some indirect way.     
The current ULA structure of launch vehicles is built upon the foundation of two 
separate companies and their historical launch facilities. In order to get past the current 
limitations of launch scheduling, the community could benefit from a study into a new 
launch facility that is capable of launching both the Atlas V and Delta IV rockets. New 
facilities mean high costs up front and long design and building periods, but in order to 
be truly flexible with the current launch vehicles, a different launch site that is not bound 
to a single vehicle type is one of the only ways to eliminate congestion in an already 
crowded launch manifest. 
A final area of further research would be to examine redundant military 
organizations inside of launch operations. At each launch base there are launch squadrons 
who have the responsibility to receive, integrate, test, and launch the mission hardware. 
There are other organizations above these launch squadrons who travel to the launch 
bases to augment the launch team. The travelling organizations are made up of identical 
career fields as those who reside at the launch sites. The additional studies could focus on 
adding personnel and responsibilities to the launch bases to focus on the launch services 
contracts and operations while reducing the travelling personnel and allowing the 
remaining support to focus on the manufacturing contracts and operations. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The success of the NROL-41 mission was a complete team effort. This mission 
specifically highlighted the benefits of the mission assurance process and resulted in 
being acclaimed as the most efficient execution of an Atlas V mission to date.   
As long as the current process is in place, execution costs will be continue to be 
high and the value of the process will vary by the importance and cost of each individual 
mission. The government should continue taking advantage of the broad spectrum of 
commercial experience that has delivered consistent mission success over the entire Atlas 
V, Delta II, and Delta IV launch history. The lessons learned from past experiences will 
help to improve the process as long as we cultivate that experience by continuing to 
infuse youth into the system. Without a proactive approach to the mission assurance 
process and support of the operators, a root cause to a launch failure would be very 
difficult to pinpoint and the blame would be placed on others rather than accepted by 
responsible parties.   
Launch will always be the riskiest operation to expensive hardware that the 
government actively operates, but continued diligence to the process will allow the 
unparalleled string of successes with these operations to continue. 
 
Figure 37.  NROL-41 Launch Trail 
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